

1 Stebbing's reply to Russell

Russell says (like Hume) that causal laws express nothing but regularities of sequence.

Stebbing: Causation cannot just be regularity of sequence. There is a reason we deny that certain regularities are causal.

- To reject Russell, we must find a way of distinguishing regularities of sequence that are causal from those that are not.

“If what we have already said about causal laws is correct, then it is a mistake to suppose that one *event* causes another *event*. We have insisted that it is an event's having a certain character that causes another event having a certain character to have some other character. The missing factor must then be found in the character of the event. Causal laws connect changes in the characters of events, and there must be continuity in this change of character. That this reference to character is essential is shown by the fact that we speak of '*regular sequence*.' Events do not recur. As we have seen, we can speak of the *same* cause on different occasions only because the causal connexion is primarily between the characters, and is derivatively between the events to which these characters belong.” (Stebbing, 305)