

1 Substancehood

Substancehood requires unity: “To put it briefly, I hold this identical proposition, differentiated only by the emphasis, to be an axiom, namely, *that what is not truly one being is not truly one being either.*” (Letters to Arnauld)

We’ve already encountered Leibniz’s first account of substance in the Discourse, where he says: “...the nature of an individual substance or of a complete being is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and to allow us to deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed.” (Discourse 8)

Later, around 1690 and on, Leibniz starts giving a second account of substance that centers around force.

- “But since then, having attempted to examine the very principles of mechanics in order to explain the laws of nature we learn from experience, I perceived that considering *extended mass* alone was not sufficient, and that it was necessary, in addition, to make use of the notion of *force*, which is very intelligible, despite the fact that it belongs in the domain of metaphysics.” (p.270)
- “I call [these forms], perhaps more intelligibly, *primitive forces*, which contain not only act or the completion of possibility, but also an original *activity.*” (p.270)
- “I think that it is obvious that primitive forces can be nothing but the internal strivings of simple substances, strivings by means of which they pass from perception to perception in accordance with a certain law of their nature, and at the same time harmonize with one another, representing the same phenomena of the universe in different ways, something that must necessarily arise from a common cause.” (Letter to De Volder)

So, the second account is that substancehood also requires a primitive force or activity that is capable of acting and being acted upon.

Death (p.271)

Mind-body unity (p.272-4)

2 The Monadology

Monads are simple – that is, without parts – but are also diverse in having a plurality of properties.

- Perception is the monad’s internal state representing external things.
- Appetite (volition) is the monad’s internal tendency to move from perception to perception.
- Apperception (consciousness) is the monad’s reflective knowledge of its internal state.

The term “mind” will be reserved for rational monads.

- Minds, in contrast with mere animal souls, have distinct perceptions that are accompanied by memory and have apperception.

- “But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is what distinguishes us from simple animals and furnishes us with *reason* and the sciences, by raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of God. And that is what we call the rational soul, or *mind*, in ourselves.”

“From this we see that there is a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, or souls in the least part of matter.” (Monadology 66)

“Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond.” (Monadology 67)

“Thus we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the animal is the soul; but the limbs of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which also has its entelechy, or its dominant soul.” (Monadology 70)

Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII): If X and Y have all and only the same properties, then X is identical to Y.

- “It is also necessary that each monad be different from each other. For there are never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic denomination.”
(p.276)