

0 Hypothetical versus absolute necessity

A proposition is absolutely necessary if its contrary implies a contradiction.

A proposition is merely hypothetically necessary if it's necessary given God's decrees, but its contrary does not imply a contradiction.

1 Letters to Arnauld

Leibniz's view: God chooses from an infinity of possible Adams.

Objection (p.248): Given that God wants to create Adam, the history of the world is (hypothetically) necessary, and hence God is not free to create it any other way.

- Reply 1: If God wants to create Adam, he already has the entire history of the world in mind.
 - Why is this?
- Reply 2: What follows follows from God's free decrees.

Objection (p.249-50): It's not the case that God knows what happens because he decrees it; so, there must be an intrinsic and necessary connection between Adams and events independent of God's decrees. But then all events occur of necessity.

- Reply: God's free decrees are included in Adam's complete concept, as possible laws.
- "...it is not so much because God decided to create this Adam that he decided on all the rest. Rather, both the decision he made with regard to Adam and the one he made with regard to other particular things are the result of the decision he made with regard to the whole universe and a result of the principal plans that determine its primitive notion and establish in it this general and inviolable order." (p.250)
- Vague Adam

Argument 1 for complete concept (p.251):

1. Had other events happened to Adam, nothing would prevent us from saying it was someone else entirely.
2. Thus it would be someone else entirely.
3. Therefore all predicates are included in the subject.

Argument 2 for complete concept:

1. Suppose I endure in AB (Paris) and BC (Germany).
2. There must be a reason for saying that it is me in both AB and BC. (PSR)
3. This can only be that my attributes in AB and those in BC are predicated of the same subject.
4. Therefore all predicates are included in the subject.

"I do not intend any connection between the subject and predicate other than that which holds in the most contingent of truths, that is, that we can always conceive something in the subject which serves to provide a reason why this predicate or event belongs to it, or why this happened rather than not. But these reasons for contingent truths incline, rather than

necessitate. Therefore, it is true that I could fail to go on this trip, but it is certain that I shall go." (p.253)

2 Mind-body unity

The problem of mind-body unity: how do mind and body causally interact?

According to Descartes' thesis of occasionalism, all events are directly caused by God himself, and hence God directly causes the body to move when the mind wills it, etc.

According to Leibniz's thesis of preestablished harmony or concomitance, mind and body also do not causally interact with each other; but, God arranges things so that each proceeds in a closed causal system but is *as if* there were causal interaction. (p.254)

- For example, the soul will feel pain when the body is struck.
 - "...for when the soul has a sensation of pain at the same time that the arm is injured, I think that the situation is... that the soul itself forms this pain, which is a natural result of its state or motion." (p.254)
 - But this is because God has arranged it so that the soul's feeling pain is a causal result of its previous state, and not of the body's striking.
- Nor will two substances really interact; but God has arranged things so that the history of the universe is the same according to both complete concepts.

The unreality of body

- The body can only be called a substance in an "improper sense." (p.255)
- "Suppose that there are two stones, for example, the diamond of the Great Duke and that of the Great Mogul. One could impose the same collective name for the two, and one could say that they constitute a pair of diamonds, although they are far apart from another; but one would not say that these two diamonds constitute a substance. Even if they were brought nearer together and made to touch, they would not be substantially united to any greater extent." (p.255)

Arnauld: How can the soul know its body will be struck and thus feel pain?

- Leibniz answers that this has something to do with the fact that each substance expresses the entire history of the universe.
- "The situation is the same for the body when it accommodates itself to the soul. And when I wish to raise my arm, it is exactly at the moment when everything in the body is disposed for that effect, so that the body moves by virtue of its own laws." (p.255)